Facing U.S. sanctions targeting its Russian-linked national oil company, Serbia is building wind and solar capacity with Chinese capital, reviving questions over governance and technology security.

Serbia is pursuing two intertwined energy agendas: reducing its long-standing dependence on Russian gas and building renewable generation capacity capable of eventually replacing coal. As a candidate for European Union membership, Serbia has committed to phasing out coal while remaining one of Europe's most Russian gas-dependent importers. That gas dependency became a point of friction with Washington after U.S. authorities imposed sanctions on Serbia's national oil company over its Russian ownership structure. The resulting supply crisis pushed Belgrade to negotiate the sale of the Russian stake to a Hungarian buyer.

The growing role of Chinese companies in renewables

Against this backdrop, the rise of Chinese investment in Serbia's renewable energy sector has revived debate over a new form of energy dependency, this time technological and financial. Chinese companies operate in Serbia in several capacities at once: as majority shareholders in project companies, as general contractors under EPC arrangements — engineering, procurement and construction — and as suppliers of wind turbines or solar inverters. Serbia's Ministry of Mines and Energy, led by Ms. Dubravka Đedović Handanović, emphasizes the diversity of partners involved in the country's green transition: European, American, Japanese, Chinese, Emirati and Israeli. The ministry nonetheless acknowledges that solar panel manufacturing remains a sector where China holds a dominant global position, echoing the recent milestone where solar overtook coal in installed capacity in the country.

Several of Serbia's largest wind projects follow a similar pattern. A Western developer — Nordic, Dutch-Belgian or British — advances a project to a mature stage, once permits are secured, land rights obtained and sometimes a state-aid quota won through public auctions, before selling a majority stake, or nearly the entire project, to a Chinese investor or group of investors. This mechanism has applied to several of the country's largest wind farms. In one of the most documented cases, the project was initially 100% owned by private Serbian investors before being sold to Chinese state-linked entities.

An emblematic case of divestment and political proximity

One of the sellers in that transaction, Mr. Nikola Petrović, had a long-standing personal relationship with Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, in office since 2017. Several analysts describe this proximity as a governance issue rather than a mere biographical detail, in a sector where the awarding of projects and public quotas remains sensitive. The account of this transaction must name this link explicitly to grasp its significance.

Mr. Petrović headed Elektromreža Srbije (EMS), Serbia's electricity transmission grid operator, from September 2012 to late 2016. He remained a 50% shareholder in the project company Crni Vrh Power until 2023, before divesting his stake. This trajectory illustrates the overlap observed between past public office, personal networks and stakes in energy project companies in Serbia.

European security analysts raise concerns

The technological dimension of the risk, as presented by analysts interviewed for this report, does not concern capital ownership itself but the nature of the equipment installed. Mr. Stefan Vladisavljev, an analyst at the BFPE foundation (Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence), and Mr. Caspar Hobhouse, an analyst at the EU Institute for Security Studies, point specifically to wind turbines that are remotely connected and controllable, as well as solar inverters — equipment whose operation and maintenance underpin a fast-growing global market, as highlighted by a recent study on the global solar operations and maintenance market. Mr. Zhang Chuanwei, president of Chinese turbine manufacturer Mingyang Smart Energy, leads one of the industrial groups whose equipment is installed in several Serbian wind farms. Several Western countries have already restricted the use of Chinese equipment in their energy infrastructure on security grounds, a precedent that fuels questions over the path Belgrade is following.