2025年4月23日，A&O Shearman律师事务所受邀作为两名法律专家之一，参与由基础设施与海事协调部举办的专题小组讨论会，会议主题为“实施垃圾发电以应对废弃物管理紧急状况”。

我们观察到，在地方政府与印尼国家电力公司（简称PLN）二者的的双重收入来源模式，两者之间缺乏同步性，阻碍了印尼具有国际融资可行性的垃圾发电项目发展。针对政府关于“单项改进措施如何提升项目吸引力”的质询，我们建议建立由信用良好的交易对手（即PLN，需获得充分财政支持）提供的单一收入来源。

2025 年 10 月 10 日，印尼总统普拉伯沃·苏比安托（President Prabowo Subianto ）终于颁布了 2025 年第 109 号总统条例，关于通过基于环境友好技术的废弃物转化为可再生能源进行城市废弃物管理（PR 109），除其他措施外，该条例还简化了垃圾发电（WtE） 项目的收入。

Key aspects of the new regulation

新法规的关键内容

Revenue stream 收入来源

There will be only a single revenue stream from PLN; no more tipping fee.

PLN将仅提供单一收入来源；不再有倾倒费。。

Fixed Feed-in Tariff (FiT) of USD 0.20/kWh for 30 years with no escalation, excluding “Special Facilities” costs. PLN is entitled to government compensation if the new FiT increases PLN’s average generation cost and/or for the development of Special Facilities.

固定上网电价（FiT）为0.20美元（约1.42人民币）/千瓦时，有效期30年且不随通胀调整，不含“特殊设施”成本。若新上网电价导致电力公司（PLN）平均发电成本上升或需开发特殊设施，PLN有权获得政府补偿。

Procurement of private investors

私人投资者的招募

Private participation is now procured centrally by BPI Danantara through WtE tenders; regional governments no longer run tenders.

私人参与现由BPI Danantara通过垃圾发电招标进行集中采购；地方政府不再负责招标事宜。

Direct appointment is allowed under specified conditions.

在特定条件下允许直接任命。

If tender interest is insufficient, the government may procure direct cooperation between the relevant regional government and interested private investor(s).

若招标兴趣不足，政府可安排相关地方政府与意向私营投资方直接合作。

Roles and obligations

职责与义务

BPI Danantara印尼投资管理公司:

(i) Procurement entity (through its investment holding, operational holding, state-owned enterprise (SOE) or SOE subsidiary) for WtE projects approved by the Minister of Environment

(i) 经环境部长批准的垃圾发电项目采购实体（通过其投资控股公司、运营控股公司、国有企业（SOE）或国有企业子公司实施）

(ii) Potential equity investor where acceptable from commercial, financial, and risk perspectives

(ii) 在商业、财务和风险方面均可接受的潜在股权投资者

Regional government地方政府：

(i) Initiates WtE projects

(i) 启动垃圾发电项目

(ii) Enters into the cooperation agreement with the project company

(ii) 与项目公司签订合作协议

(iii) Ensures at least 1,000 tons/day waste supply during operations (regulation is silent on “on-spec” composition)

(iii) 确保运营期间每日至少供应1,000吨废弃物（法规未对“符合规格”的成分作出规定）

(iv) Allocates regional budget for collection and transport to the WtE plant (no specific mention of sorting or storage)

(iv) 为垃圾收集及运输至垃圾焚烧发电厂分配区域预算（未特别提及分拣或储存环节）

(v) Provides land on a no-cost lend-lease basis

(v) 以无偿租借方式提供土地

(vi) Implements regional clean service retribution

(vi) 实施区域清洁服务补偿

(vii) Includes WtE development in regional plans and the waste management master plan

(vii) 将垃圾发电项目纳入区域规划和废弃物管理总体规划

(viii) Includes in the cooperation agreement, among others, compensation for failure to deliver committed waste volume and an event-of-default regime

（viii）在合作协议中纳入未能交付承诺废弃物量的赔偿和违约事件制度等

PLN印尼国家电力公司:

(i) Purchases electricity from WtE projects

(i) 从垃圾发电项目购买电力

(ii) FiT subject to review by the minister of energy and mineral resources

(ii) 固定电价需经能源与矿产资源部长审核

(iii) FiT applies to electricity after the scheduled commercial operating date (COD), with no clarity on tariff applicable to early COD (if such early COD is agreed)

(iii) 固定电价补贴适用于计划商业运营日期（COD）之后的电力，但未明确规定提前商业运营（如达成此类提前运营协议）适用的电价。

(iv) Take-and-pay applies where the WtE company is in breach due to technical errors outside its control or there are waste-volume issues, with the regulation silent on take-or-pay in other circumstances (e.g., government action/inaction, change in law, PLN default)

(iv) 取付条款适用于垃圾发电公司因不可控的技术故障违约或存在垃圾量问题的情形，而法规对其他情形（如政府行为/不作为、法律变更、PLN违约）下的取付条款未作规定。

(v) PPA is must-dispatched on a priority basis in accordance with annual contracted energy, with the regulation silent on delivery-or-pay.

(v) 根据年度合同电量，PPA垃圾发电公司电力必须被优先调度，且该条例未提及照付不议条款。

Grandfathering

不受新规定限制

Grandfathering applies to existing WtE projects that have any of the following: (i) a winning bidder stipulated by the regional government; (ii) a signed concession agreement with the regional government; and/or (iii) a PPA with PLN.

既有豁免条款适用于具备以下任一条件的现有垃圾发电项目：

(i) 由地方政府指定的中标方；

(ii) 已与地方政府签署特许经营协议；

(iii) PPA承包商公司与国家电力公司（PLN）签订购电协议。

Grandfathered projects may opt into PR 109 if such projects fail to: (i) process waste into electricity, (ii) reduce waste volume significantly; and/or (iii) reduce waste processing time significantly with environmentally friendly technology and upon final and binding termination of existing project arrangements. The regulation is silent on whether this will be direct appointments.

既有项目若未能满足以下条件，可选择适用PR 109条款：

(i)未实现废弃物发电转化；

(ii)未显著减少废弃物体积；

(iii)未采用环保技术显著缩短废弃物处理周期，且须在现有项目协议最终且具有约束力地终止后方可适用。该条例未明确说明此类项目是否将通过直接任命方式实施。

Our preliminary commentaries

我们的初步评论

PR 109’s framework is commercially clarifying but leaves several bankability inflection points for sponsors and lenders:

PR 109框架在商业层面具有明确性，但仍为发起方和贷款方留下了若干银行可融资性拐点：

The shift to a single revenue stream from PLN simplifies cash flows but transfers waste-supply and composition risk squarely onto regional governments and project companies, particularly given the regulation’s silence on “on spec” waste.

从PLN转向单一收入来源虽简化了现金流，却将废弃物供应与构成风险完全转嫁给地方政府和项目公司——尤其考虑到该法规对“投机性”废弃物未作任何规定。

A fixed, non-escalating 20 cents/kWh FiT over 30 years, while materially higher than legacy tariffs, creates inflation and O&M cost pass-through risk over the long term.

30年内固定且不递增的每千瓦时20美分（约1.42人民币）的上网电价，虽然远高于传统电价，但长期来看会产生通胀风险及运营维护成本转嫁风险。

PLN’s entitlement to government compensation if its average generation cost or Special Facilities costs increase is a useful fiscal support, but the project-level certainty hinges on how that compensation interplays with PPA tariff sufficiency.

若PLN的平均发电成本或特殊设施成本上升，其获得政府补偿的权利构成一项有效的财政支持，但项目层面的确定性取决于该补偿机制与购电协议电价充足性之间的互动关系。

Centralizing procurement through BPI Danantara is a notable pivot that could accelerate pipeline development and standardize risk allocation.

通过BPI Danantara集中采购是一项重大战略调整，有望加速管道开发进程并规范风险分担机制。

BPI Danantara ability to act as an equity investor may also de-risk initial financings.

BPI Danantara作为股权投资者的能力也可降低初始融资的风险。

However, we note that key gaps remain, amongst others:

然而，我们注意到仍存在关键差距，其中包括：

Ambiguity around take-and-pay versus take-or-pay in events beyond project default or inadequate waste volume/off-spec waste composition

除了项目违约或废弃物量不足/废弃物成分不合格之外，在“取并付费条款(take-and-pay)”与“照付不议条款(take-or-pay)”之间仍然存在模糊性

Uncertainty on tariffing for early COD

早期商业运营日期（COD）计费方式的不确定性

The lack of an explicit obligation for waste sorting or composition control

缺乏明确的垃圾分类或成分控制义务

All of these will need to be addressed in the concession and PPA to achieve financeable structures.

所有这些问题都需在特许权协议和电力购买协议中予以解决，以实现可融资的结构。

Conclusion

结论

In conclusion, the regulation provides a strong policy signal—priority dispatch up to annual contracted energy, centralized tendering, and clear delineation of stakeholder roles—but sponsors should expect intensive negotiation on waste volume guarantees, composition tolerances, make whole and curtailment regimes, and inflation protection given the non-escalating FiT.

综上所述，该法规传递出强有力的政策信号——包括优先调度至年度合同电量上限、集中招标以及明确划分利益相关方职责——但鉴于固定电价补贴机制不设递增条款，发起方应预期在废弃物处理量保障、成分容差、补偿机制与限电制度以及通胀保护措施等方面将面临密集谈判。

Regional governments bear meaningful obligations, including land provision on a no cost lend lease basis, assured waste volumes of at least 1,000 tons/day, and implementation of clean service retribution, with default and compensation consequences for shortfalls.

地方政府承担着实质性义务，包括以无偿借地形式提供土地、确保每日至少1000吨的垃圾处理量，以及实施清洁服务补偿机制，若未达标将面临违约及赔偿后果。

Grandfathered projects gain an optional pathway to align with the new regime, but only upon final and binding termination of existing arrangements.

既既有项目可选择性地过渡至新制度，但前提是现有安排须最终且具有约束力地终止。

Overall, PR 109 is a step toward bankable standardization, yet prudent risk allocation will depend on detailed PPA and cooperation agreement drafting, with particular attention to waste specification, payment certainty, and long-term cost inflation.

总体而言，PR 109是迈向可融资标准化的一步，但审慎的风险分配仍需依赖详细的购电协议与合作协议的起草，尤其需关注废弃物规格、付款确定性及长期成本通胀问题。